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Abstract  
Effectively designed complaint handling systems play a key role in enabling vulnerable consumers to 
complain and obtain redress.   This article examines current research into consumer vulnerability, 
highlighting its multidimensional and expansive nature. Contemporary understandings of consumer 
vulnerability recognise that the interaction between a wide range of market and consumer 
characteristics can combine to place any individual at risk of vulnerability. While this broad definition 
of consumer vulnerability reflects the complex reality of consumers’ experiences, it poses a key 
challenge for designers of complaint handling systems: how can they identify and respond to an issue 
which can potentially affect everyone?    
Drawing on current research and practice in the UK and Australia, the article analyses the impact of 
consumer vulnerability on third party dispute resolution schemes and considers the role these 
complaint handling organisations can play in supporting their complainants.  Third party complaint 
handling organisations, including a range of Alternative Dispute Resolution services such as 
ombudsman organisations, can play a key role in increasing access to justice for vulnerable consumer 
groups and provide specific assistance for individual complainants during the process.  
It is an opportune time to review whether the needs of consumers at risk of vulnerability are being met 
within complaint processes and the extent to which third party complaint handlers support those who 
are most vulnerable to seek redress. Empowering vulnerable consumers to complain presents specific 
challenges.  The article discusses the application of a new model of consumer dispute system design 
to show how complaint handling organisations can meet the needs of the most vulnerable consumers 
throughout the process. 
Key words 
Consumer vulnerability, vulnerable complainants, complaint handling, dispute system design (DSD), 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), third party complaint handlers 
Introduction    
The article focuses on the implications of consumer vulnerability for complaint management 
processes in Australia and the UK.  Over the past decade, consumer vulnerability has been recognised 
as an important characteristic and a barometer which provides an insight into the extent to which 
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markets meet social needs and contribute to social welfare.  The government, some consumer 
organisations and regulators believe that empowered consumers, including the vulnerable, are 
essential to the success of competitive markets (Brennan and Coppack, 2008).  Third party ADR 
schemes are one of the means through which policymakers have sought to empower consumers vis a 
vis service providers, recognising the limited accessibility of the courts and the need to provide 
quicker, less formal, and easier to use processes for consumer disputes (Hodges et al.,  2012). 
However, the challenges faced by third party ADR schemes in identifying, supporting, and working 
with vulnerable consumers remains an underexplored area of research, policy, and practice. This 
article seeks to make a contribution to existing understandings by (a) discussing the evolving concept 
of consumer vulnerability (b) identifying the challenges faced by practitioners as a result of the 
current expansive definition of consumer vulnerability and (c) drawing on an established model for 
dispute system design (DSD) (Gill et al., 2016; Williams and Gill, 2016) to explore how ADR bodies 
can respond to these challenges.  It will argue that definitions of vulnerability increasingly recognise 
the transitory and multidimensional nature of vulnerability.  As a result designing complaint handling 
systems which meet the needs of vulnerable consumers will benefit other consumers too.      To 
address this the article is in three parts: the first part deals with contextual issues; the second part 
reviews the literature on consumer vulnerability; and the third part discusses how ADR bodies can 
meet the challenges of consumer vulnerability.  
Part I: Context 
It is not clear how many people may be classified as ‘vulnerable’ within the complaint handling 
sector. Estimates of complaint activity in countries such as Australia suggest that more than 8 million 
formal complaints are made per year (Sourdin, 2016).  In the UK 18.7 million problems with goods 
and services were experienced in 2014 (Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 2014).    Official 
statistics suggest that a significant proportion of these consumers may be vulnerable.   In the UK over 
11 million people report a limiting long term illness (Department for Work and Pensions and the 
Office for Disability Issues, 2014), 1.5 million people have some form of learning disability, one in 
four will experience at least one mental health disorder (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015) and over 
1.5 million people in the UK are over the age of 85 (Age UK, 2016).   Large scale population studies 
in both the United States and Australia suggest that up to 20 per cent of the population may have a 
personality disorder which may make some people more vulnerable (Sourdin and Wallace, 2014).  As 
will be discussed, not all people in these groups will be vulnerable but some may be more susceptible 
than the general population.   
Complaint handlers may typically be at first tier (within the organisation supplying the goods or 
services) or at second tier (within ombudsman and other alternative dispute resolution services). For 
the purposes of this article we have referred to those at second tier as third party complaint handlers. 
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The focus of this article is on third party complaint handlers, independent of the organisations that 
have caused the dissatisfaction, and includes a range of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services 
including adjudication schemes and ombudsman organisations.   Drawing on  a British Standard on 
Inclusive Service Provision, BS18477  (British Standards Institution,  2010), a number of UK 
regulators and complaint handlers  have been, or are in the process of, reviewing their approach to 
consumer vulnerability including the energy regulator, Ofgem  (2013), the Legal Services Consumer 
Panel (2014), the Financial Conduct Authority (2015) and the Financial Ombudsman Service (2015). 
Consumer vulnerability and ADR are also key areas of interest in Europe: the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive 2005/29/EC protects not only ‘average’ consumers but those who are  
‘vulnerable’, and the Directive on Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution (2013/11/EU) requires 
member states to ensure that ADR mechanisms are available to resolve all consumer disputes. In the 
context where less than half of EU consumers (44 per cent) find it easy to resolve disputes with sellers 
through ADR (European Commission, 2013), the European Parliament has called on Member States 
to ensure that their provision of ADR makes it possible for vulnerable consumers to have effective 
access to justice  (European Parliament, 2011).  In Australia, the Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) compliance and enforcement policy sets out the principles adopted, outlining 
enforcement powers, functions, priorities, strategies and regime (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, 2015) with a focus on conduct detrimentally affecting disadvantaged or 
vulnerable consumer groups. 
 
Challenges exist in relation to meeting the needs of those who may be vulnerable.  As markets 
become increasingly complex, more people are likely to become vulnerable (Cartwright, 2007;  Pavia 
and Mason, 2014,).  As efforts to improve the accessibility of complaint systems gather pace, more 
vulnerable consumers may be expected to use third party complaint handling organisations. Recently, 
ombudsman organisations, particularly in Australia and the UK, have also started to pay attention to 
the issue of unreasonable complainant conduct and it appears that there is evidence that some of this is 
associated with querulent individuals who may also be suffering from some form of mental health 
disorder (Mullen and Lester, 2006).    This presents some very difficult challenges for dispute 
resolution schemes both in terms of the disproportionate burden of handling these complaints but also 
because there are are real reputational risks to failing to respond effectively, particularly where the 
complainants may be perceived to be vulnerable (Hibbert et al., 2012).   These developments suggest 
that additional frameworks, models, strategies, policies and processes are required to assist 
organisations to meet the needs of vulnerable consumers.      
.   
Part II   Consumer vulnerability – reaching a more holistic definition 
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Defining consumer vulnerability   
Over the past thirty years, researchers, commentators and policy makers have proposed varying 
definitions of what it means to be a ‘vulnerable consumer’(Baker et al., 2005).  Despite this attention 
there is no settled definition of what constitutes ‘vulnerability’.  Early approaches tended to focus 
heavily on the personal characteristics and circumstances of particular groups of consumers and there 
is a high degree of consistency in the literature in the US, Europe and Australia on the categories 
associated with potential vulnerability which include (1) age (2) low income (3) those who do not 
work (4) long term disabled (5) those with lower educational attainment (6) rural dwellers and (7) 
ethnic minorities (Clifton et al., 2013).   
There now appears to be broad agreement, which has moved the debate beyond individual traits, 
highlighting firstly the multi-dimensional nature of vulnerability (Baker et al, 2005; Ofgem, 2013; 
Hamilton et al, 2015; ); secondly that consumer vulnerability is dynamic and transient (Baker et al., 
2005; British Standards Institution,  2010;  Financial Conduct Authority, 2015; George et al., 2015;  
Hamilton et al., 2015 ); thirdly that all of us have the potential to be vulnerable when placed in a 
consumption situation over which one has little control (Baker et al., 2005; Shultz and Holbrook, 
2009; British Standards Institution, 2010;  Harrison and Chalmers, 2013; Pavia and Mason, 2014; 
Financial Conduct Authority, 2015);  and finally the impact of the market on consumer vulnerability  
(Consumer Affairs Victoria, 2004; Baker et al., 2005; Cartwright, 2007; Australian Productivity 
Commission, 2008;  Shultz and Holbrook, 2009; British Standards Institution, 2010;  Ofgem 2013, 
Pavia and Mason, 2014; Financial Conduct Authority,  2015; George et al., 2015;). According to 
Baker et al. (2005), and supported by Ofgem (2013), vulnerability is very much about the situation 
that the person is in at that particular time and not who is the individual.  These arguments suggest 
that vulnerability could be viewed as a spectrum with the transitory view helpful in reinforcing the 
point that ‘any individual might experience vulnerability at one point in time’ (Harrison and 
Chalmers, 2013 p 454).  Recent EU research highlighted that almost 75% of consumers will at one 
time or another exhibit at least one dimension of vulnerability (European Commission, 2016).    
Relationship between disadvantage and vulnerability 
One of the key questions to be considered is the relationship with disadvantage.    Baker et al. (2005) 
have suggested that vulnerability is not the same as disadvantage as actual vulnerability occurs as a 
result of the interaction between an individual’s circumstances and the market.  For instance, in 
markets where the quality of services is hard to ascertain and communicate to consumers, such as 
legal services, many will be vulnerable, despite not being disadvantaged by their personal 
characteristics. By contrast, for simple purchases, it is conceivable that someone who might be 
described as disadvantaged would not be particularly vulnerable; many low income consumers are 
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very astute with learned strategies that reduce future susceptibility in a repeat situation (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2008).  Commuri and Ekici (2008) have criticised Baker et al.’s approach 
for being too willing to abandon a ‘class based’ approach, arguing that there is merit in recognising 
that certain characteristics do make certain groups more vulnerable, and therefore provides a helpful 
construct for policy makers to use as a pre-emptive tool to tackle consumer vulnerability. 
Pavia and Mason (2014), while supporting Baker et al’s construct of vulnerability, also point out that 
some types of vulnerability, particularly those relating to disability, and may be permanent and more 
challenging.  In Australia, the Government’s Productivity Commission (AGPC 2008) have recognised 
the continued importance of individual traits to consumer detriment suggesting policymakers and 
organisations need to consider both vulnerability and disadvantage (Australian Government 
Productivity Commission, 2008).  They argue that tackling disadvantage is typically harder for policy 
makers to address since it is often persistent.   
A proactive and broader approach to identifying those at risk of vulnerability is evident in the UK in 
the British Standard on Inclusive Service, BS18477 (British Standards Institution, 2010) which 
proposes that organisations should identify ‘risk factors’ which can make consumers more susceptible 
to detriment and encourages them to proactively take action to address them.   The standard identifies 
ten common risk factors which include age, disability or other impairment, mental health issues, low 
income, sudden change in circumstances and the complexity of the product.  Although the take up of 
the standard by first tier organisations has been slow (Citizens Advice 2015) this approach has been 
broadly supported in the UK by a number of regulators and third party complaint handlers to inform 
their approach (George et al., 2015).  The British Standards Institution’s (BSI) approach is illustrative 
of the more complex and multi-dimensional definitions of consumer vulnerability, and highlights the 
changeability of the status of the consumer, on the basis of their own changing needs in combination 
with the particular situation with which they are faced. This approach sits on the spectrum which 
defines consumer vulnerability as ‘transitory’ at one extreme, and ‘persistent’ at the other.  
In summary, the debate regarding the definition of vulnerability is ongoing.   In the context of 
complaint handling, we embrace a view of consumer vulnerability which highlights both its persistent 
nature for certain classes of consumer and its multidimensional and potentially transitory nature.   We 
define consumer vulnerability as the interaction of personal predicaments, individual characteristics, 
and external conditions, within a consumer context, that negatively affects that person’s 
consumption/citizen experience or experience of the complaint handling processes or systems to 
which they are exposed. The next section considers how the challenges posed for third party 
complaint handlers in relation to vulnerable complainants may be addressed through effective dispute 
system design. 
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Part 111   Supporting vulnerable complainants to use ADR schemes: applying lessons from 
dispute system design  
The first challenge faced by third party complaint handlers is encouraging those at risk of 
vulnerability to complain. As noted in the context section above, there is a fairly deep pool of 
problems that do not result in complaints due to consumer vulnerability, with those most in need of 
redress least likely to know about and make use of third party complaint schemes.  The second 
challenge is how to support those vulnerable complainants. To explore how the challenges may be 
addressed, the article will draw on  a dispute system design (DSD) model (Gill et al., 2016; Williams 
and Gill, 2016) which suggests a systematic five-step approach to the task of designing ADR 
schemes.  
Step 1 involves research and analysis to understand contextual factors, such as the scope and 
seriousness of likely consumer detriment in the market for which the ADR scheme is being designed. 
Step 2 involves goal-setting and prioritising the various goals such as inclusivity or accessibility. 
Steps 3 and 4 relate to substantive design choices. Step 3 considers the design of overall dispute 
systems, considering features of institutional design such as jurisdiction and governance 
arrangements. Step 4 considers the more granular issues around process design and the choices that 
are required in terms of specific dispute resolution practices.  The final step in the model (not 
discussed in this article) is evaluation, where outcomes feed back into the continual re-design of 
consumer dispute resolution (CDR) mechanisms.   
This five step model is supplemented by a range of factors discussed by Sourdin (2016), including the 
broader influence of tradition, the political context, the role of institutions, power and ideology (see 
Burton, 1990 and Tillett, 1991among others). A dominating rights-based discourse may, for example, 
mean that processes that foster more interest-based and reflective approaches are viewed as dissonant 
or ‘out of step’ (Glendon, 1991). Other relevant factors in terms of individual diagnosis are articulated 
in the early work of Galtung (1971).  Galtung suggests that a systemic approach involves first 
diagnosing the situation, considering the sources of any conflict and then responding to these wider 
approaches to conflict, which might include relying on data mining to prevent recurring issues from 
arising. The second stage could involve exploring the conflict attitudes of the participants that 
represent a subjective approach to conflict. This article incorporates such perspectives into the overall 
model suggested by Gill et al. (2016) and uses this framework to highlight design choices that CDR 
mechanisms can make to meet the needs of consumers at risk of vulnerability.   
Step 1:  Research and analysis  
7 
 
In the first step, identification of the problems faced by vulnerable complainants is critical. This may 
include identifying the number of consumers at risk, what the disputes concern, the amount of 
detriment, how disputes are being processed and the nature of current and anticipated problems. 
Views of stakeholders should be obtained, including any legal requirements and attention should be 
paid to both contextual and cultural factors (Gill et al., 2016). 
The first challenge relates to encouraging vulnerable consumers to complain.  It is generally assumed 
that vulnerable consumers are less likely to complain with some researchers arguing that social 
demographics are not necessarily a good guide to explain differences in customer complaint 
behaviour (Singh, 1990; Phau and Baird, 2008; Garrett and Tourmanoff, 2010). Others including 
Ennew and Schoefer (2003) reviewed the literature on complaining and non-complaining and 
identified that customers who do not complain are more likely to be at lower socio-economic levels, 
may be part of a disadvantaged group, and may have submissive personality factors.  In the field of 
legal needs research, Coumarelos et al.’s (2012) extensive review across a number of jurisdictions 
demonstrated that disadvantaged groups are less likely to take action, appear to lack legal knowledge 
and have difficulty solving their problems without advice.  
Secondly, while complaining to third parties is low across all sectors  (UK research for the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS, 2014) suggest just  6 per cent make a complaint 
to a third party) it is also assumed that  rates are even lower for the most vulnerable consumers.  
Existing research on third party complaint handlers tends to focus on ombudsman organisations and is 
inconclusive. Van Roosbroek & Van de Walle (2008) and Hertogh (2013) highlight the very narrow 
middle class demographic which uses ombudsman schemes in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Reviewing the UK’s Financial Ombudsman Service in 2008, Lord Hunt QC accused the organisation 
of being ‘a middle class service for middle class people’ (Hunt 2008, p.2) although there is evidence 
that their demographic of complaints has changed in recent years (Financial Ombudsman Service, 
2015).  Creutzfeldt’s (2016) recent research into 14 ADR schemes in the UK, Germany and France 
found that complainants were predominantly male, over 50 and well educated.   On the other hand the 
Australian Government’s Productivity Commission (2008) concluded that ombudsmen schemes were 
effective in promoting access to justice and were highly accessible compared to other forms of dispute 
resolution though more could be done to improve access for disadvantaged consumers.   Research for 
the Energy Regulator Ofgem in the UK also found that there were few differences in the profile of 
consumers who escalated complaints to the ombudsman than those who did not (George et al., 2015).   
Finally research also suggests that disadvantaged consumers who do take action are more likely to 
seek advice on how to tackle their problem (Balmer et al., 2010) and that legal problems tend to 
cluster together and coexist with other social, economic and health issues (Buck and Curran, 2009; 
Saunders, 2011).  Legal needs research found that that there was a strong association between 
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experiencing legal problems and long term illness / disability, particularly mental illness (Coumarelos 
et al., 2013).   
These findings would appear to have major implications for many third party complaint handlers in 
designing effective complaint mechanisms which meet the needs of all consumers.  Trusted 
intermediaries play an essential role in supporting vulnerable consumers in disputes (Felstiner et al., 
1980; Sandefur, 2007; Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2014; Local Government 
Ombudsman/Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, 2014; Financial Conduct Authority, 
2015; Stearn, 2016). Third party complaint handlers therefore need to work effectively with these 
organisations. In some cases those intermediaries may be commercial businesses – in the UK Claims 
Management Companies have potentially changed the demographic of complainants contacting the 
Financial Ombudsman Service by actively seeking out unmet need in a client group which is likely to 
include vulnerable consumers.    Excellent referral mechanisms are also likely to be needed to support 
vulnerable consumers in relation to the multiple issues that may arise (Stearn, 2012; Financial 
Conduct Authority, 2015 and Local Government Ombudsman/Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman, 2015).    
Step 2:  Goals  
Having clear goals and objectives informs subsequent system design choices and allows competing 
goals to be ranked and prioritised.   Typical goals in relation to Consumer Dispute Resolution (CDR) 
relate to improving efficiency; increasing access to justice; improving consumer confidence and 
ensuring appropriate procedural and quality safeguards are in place to secure consumer and business 
trust (Gill et al., 2016).  Scheme goals or objectives may target vulnerable consumer groups if the 
market in which the scheme operates is known to unduly impact on certain classes of consumer.  
Third party complaint handlers are likely to face a large number of conflicting pressures and need to 
be clear about their priorities and the extent to which widening access to justice is a core goal for the 
scheme.   In the UK, some third party complaint handling schemes are in competition with each other 
to secure the participation of businesses: as a result, maintaining a low cost base is likely to dominate 
their goal setting, perhaps at the expense of widening access measures.  
Gill and Hirst (2016), examining consumer ombudsmen in the United Kingdom, suggested that some 
aspects were still considered to be ‘added value’ and not necessarily part of the routine services 
provided by those organisations. These include providing advice and support to complainants which 
other research suggests is particularly important to disadvantaged consumers (Balmer et al., 2010).  
The key issue here relates to the cost associated with more proactive approaches to identifying and 
catering for consumer vulnerability.  Other contextual factors relate to the difficult position in which 
many ADR providers find themselves, sandwiched between regulators and businesses. Gilad (2008) 
has referred to this as the ‘domain’ of ADR schemes and suggested that they have to tread a fine line 
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in terms of finding their legitimate sphere of action. For example, an ADR scheme with strong goals 
around consumer vulnerability may advertise to ensure that particular at risk individuals are aware of 
their service, but this may be seen as an ‘ambulance chasing’ approach by businesses. The context 
surrounding the ADR scheme and the relative strength of the pressures they face from their business 
and regulatory environment is therefore likely to play a key role in the extent to which goals around 
consumer vulnerability can be prioritised in practice. 
Step 3:  System design issues  
A number of system design choices directly impact on the ability of a complaint handling body to 
tackle vulnerability, particularly choices relating to jurisdiction, governance, funding, accessibility 
and dispute design philosophy. A key issue from the perspective of user-friendliness is the breadth of 
the jurisdiction of the ADR body. Narrow jurisdictions and statutory limitations on access are likely to 
be seen as impediments that may be particularly off-putting for complainants. A classic example of 
this is the requirement for complaints about central government in the UK to be made via a Member 
of Parliament, viewed by critics as a significant barrier to accessibility (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2013). Recent research into groups of complainants who are dissatisfied with the 
performance of ombudsman schemes in the UK has suggested that the remits of some ombudsman 
schemes are too narrow, failing to address consumer concerns (Creutzfeldt and Gill, 2015). When 
setting the jurisdiction of a scheme, a careful balance must be struck between defining the issues that 
it is appropriate for the scheme to deal with, and avoiding measures which will deter consumer 
complaints.  
Ensuring consumer representation on the boards of ADR organisations (or their advisory/ audit 
committees), seeking regular consumer feedback from users to inform organisational policy, and 
commissioning research to better understand particular sections of their client base will inform and 
strengthen governance. Programmes of consumer engagement are likely to be especially important 
and there are recent examples of innovative practice within the UK ADR community. The Local 
Government Ombudsman, for example, runs an advisory group composed of senior staff, former 
complainants and consumer advice organisations, which is used as a sounding board for 
organisational practices and developments. Recent work has included auditing decision letters to 
assess clarity and accessibility for consumers. Similarly, the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission’s 
Consumer Panel is an advisory body which assists the Commission to understand fully, and take 
account of, the interests of consumers in its policy and process developments and decisions and 
provides the Commission with feedback, from a consumer perspective, on the effectiveness of 
policies and practices (Scottish Legal Complaints Commission, 2016). The Panel recently commented 
on the Commission’s new three year strategy and saw their comments reflected in the final strategy, 
including that the needs of diverse consumers must be taken into account.  
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Outreach work is organised to engage with those groups who have not traditionally made much use of 
third party complaint handers to strengthen accessibility (Australian Government Productivity 
Commission, 2014).   A recent report into the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman in the 
UK called for ‘enhanced outreach work, to ensure that disadvantaged and marginalised individuals 
and communities are encouraged to see themselves as part of the ombudsman's natural constituency 
and not outsiders’ (O’Brien, 2015 p279).     Schemes can also expect a higher than average proportion 
of people seeking assistance will have a disability, multiple issues and present late with their 
complaints (Coumarelos et al., 2012).   
In relation to dispute resolution philosophy, adopting an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial 
approach enables complaint handlers to redress the balance of power between the organisation and the 
consumer (Gill et al., 2016).  Gilad’s (2010) research into the UK’s Financial Ombudsman Service 
found evidence that the scheme provided an effective redress mechanism for those at risk of 
vulnerability.  She argued that the fair and reasonable test, used by a number of Ombuds schemes, 
was sufficiently wide to ensure that vulnerable circumstances of the particular complainant were taken 
into account while the absence of precedent also helped to ensure that repeat players were not 
advantaged (Gilad, 2010). This suggests that schemes which adopt strict legal criteria as opposed to a 
fair and reasonable or maladministration perspective may be less able to cater for the needs of 
vulnerable consumers.  Dispute resolution philosophy also raises questions over whether a rights 
based or interest based approach should be adopted.   While the latter are often considered to be less 
intimidating for consumers and more flexible, there is a danger that consensual dispute resolution  
(such as mediation, where outcomes cannot be imposed by the third party) does not do enough to give 
confidence to consumers that the power imbalance between them and an organisation will be 
redressed.  Providing evidence of effectiveness and making clear the powers of the scheme to redress 
power imbalances may therefore be an essential part of ADR schemes' work to reach vulnerable and 
less engaged consumers. This also implies that high profile strategies to publicise cases and 
demonstrate the potential value of raising complaints may be required. Hertogh (2013), looking at 
public ombudsman schemes in the Netherlands and Belgium, suggests that those who are least likely 
to have faith in government are least likely to complain to ombudsmen. 
Step 4:   Process design choices  
The choices for designers relate to process type, process architecture, the use of technology, the 
scheme’s powers, scope and decision maker attributes. Typical decisions to be made here include 
whether to use predominantly evaluative, adjudicative or facilitative processes, whether to use a single 
or multiple stage process, the extent to which technology and Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) can 
be used to support complaint handling, and choices relating to the qualifications and skills of the 
complaint handlers.  There are mechanisms that can be used to assist in respect of process choice. 
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Processes can include the use of a risk assessment matrix (Sourdin, 2016) to assess the risk, severity 
and complexity of the complaint and ensure that complaints are appropriately escalated and handled. 
Arguably this could include capacity to deal with vulnerable consumer matters more effectively.  
Simplicity and transparency of process, the need for informality (no rules of evidence, no precedent) 
and a desire to avoid emphasising organisationally produced documentation over consumer accounts 
will all help to meet the needs of vulnerable consumers (Lens, 2007).  Where a choice of process is 
offered schemes need to try to keep them as simple as possible and provide clear information to the 
consumer about what the choices entail. Even the best designed processes are likely to be difficult for 
certain categories of vulnerability – especially where distress is significant, so there may be a need for 
external and independent support to be provided. The Patient Advice and Support Service (PASS) 
provided by Citizens Advice Scotland is an interesting model, recognising the particular likelihood of 
vulnerability in health settings, the severity of the power imbalance and the technical complexity of 
issues (Citizens Advice Scotland, 2016).  
The extent to which technology may facilitate vulnerable consumers to complain remains unclear. 
Complaint handling organisations, such as ‘Resolver’ in the UK, or ‘Guided Resolution’ in Australia, 
provide online information about consumer rights tailored to the type of enquiry or organisation, 
empowering people to have a better understanding of the legitimacy of their complaint.  There are 
some encouraging signs.  While online and mobile technologies will not meet the needs of all 
vulnerable consumer groups, research on the, soon to be defunct, Dutch online interactive dispute 
resolution platform, Rechtwijzer.nl, found that low income and low education consumers were 
frequent visitors to the tool (Bickel et al., 2015).  Others have argued that vulnerable consumers are 
likely to need more guidance and support rather than less (Future Foundation, 2014).  In the UK 18% 
of consumers do not have access to or the required skills to use technology and this figure is likely to 
be higher for vulnerable consumers (Ministry of Justice, 2016).  The UK’s Financial Ombudsman 
Service reported that 47% of complainants over the age of 65 could not access the internet (Financial 
Ombudsman Service, 2015).   
In terms of decision maker attributes, an ability to demonstrate empathy and approachability is key.    
To respond to the individual’s situation, the organisation needs to have good disclosure practices 
although individuals are often reluctant to share information about vulnerability.  Effective complaints 
procedures should provide opportunities to identify clues that a person is vulnerable and not place the 
onus on the consumer to self disclose (Citizens Advice, 2015).  Practice examples from the UK refer 
to the use of speech analytics to detect vulnerability (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015) while the 
UK’s Financial Ombudsman Service suggested that simply starting each conversation with the 
statement ‘is there anything we can do to make it easier for you to talk to us and for us to talk to you?’ 
can make a big impact (Citizens Advice, 2015 p60).  Research in the water industry in the UK found 
that consumers in vulnerable circumstances felt that there were few attempts to understand their 
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individual circumstances and that the tone and content of communications were often inappropriate 
(Accent, 2012).  Chalmer’s (2016) model of ethical fairness in communication in the finance industry 
highlights the need for good communication and an understanding that fairness involves going beyond 
managerialist/ proceduralist understandings.   Gilad (2008) too has referred to the importance of 
treating consumers with respect and dignity.  The literature on justice suggests that these aspects of 
process could be particularly important where consumers are vulnerable.  Halstead et al.’s (2007) 
qualitative research found that ‘disadvantaged’ consumers were particularly sensitive to issues 
relating to respect and dignity, focusing heavily on interactional fairness when judging services.  
In the context of skills required to deal with complaints, the authors note that recent developments in 
the complaint handling sector have increasingly focussed on the professionalisation of those who 
work in the sector (Sourdin, 2016). The development of complaint professional certification schemes 
(Australian Centre for Justice Innovation and SOCAP, 2015; Ombudsman Association, 2016) are 
directed at enhancing complaint handling skills more generally and, in respect of specific issues, 
arising in relation to both vulnerability and unreasonable behaviours.  
Challenging behaviour  
Recently ombudsman and other third party complaint handling organisations, in Australia and the UK, 
have increasingly focussed on the issue of unreasonable complainant conduct and its cost to complaint 
handling organisations.    Studies have suggested that between 1 and 5% of complainants exhibited 
unreasonably persistent behaviour (Mullen and Lester, 2006; New South Wales Ombudsman, 2012) 
yet accounted for 15 – 30 per cent of resources.   Guidelines have been published to provide advice 
for the management of unreasonable complainant behaviour and most of these suggest that the focus 
needs to be on the conduct of the complainant, rather than on the complainant as a ‘difficult’ person 
(New South Wales Ombudsman 2012; Skilling et al, 2012).  Complaint handling organisations are 
increasingly adopting ‘unacceptable action’ policies. What distinguishes these approaches are the 
factors which differentiate the focus of the mental health professional compared to that of the 
complaint handler (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2009).  It is interesting to consider this medical 
context in relation to complaint handling, where psychiatrists have identified certain behaviours that 
complaint handlers often see. Lester et al. (2004) found that in a study of unusually persistent 
complainants, behaviours were consistent with the psychiatric diagnosis of ‘querulence’. Eddy (2006) 
also defines ‘high conflict people’ in legal disputes, with reference to personality disorders described 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association. The 
Commonwealth Ombudsman (2009) manual uses the term ‘unreasonable complainant conduct’, 
which is the same language used in the Ombudsman legislation which allows a finding to be made 
that an agency/business’s conduct is or was unreasonable. Applying the same reasoning to 
complainants allows the Ombudsman to more precisely define and manage the problem. Among the 
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techniques suggested in that manual and, common to many others, are separating the people from the 
problem and using clear communication. Approaches that can assist in this area, include better 
process explanations, early triage into specialised complaint handling approaches, having clear 
policies and frameworks and specialised skills to support those that may have ‘obsessive and 
unreasonable’ behaviours (Sourdin and Wallace, 2014). 
Conclusion 
Issues relating to consumer vulnerability pose challenges for complaint handlers who are trying to 
meet their needs. A threshold issue is that vulnerable consumers tend not to complain.  Complaint 
handlers have a role in alleviating vulnerability by improving the accessibility of redress and 
maximising consumer participation. Once vulnerable consumers are ‘in’ the system they may pose 
specific challenges requiring more time and support. Complaint systems should be designed not just 
to facilitate access in the first place but to meet needs when vulnerable consumers complain.    
In reviewing the literature on consumer vulnerability and complaint handling, the paper has sought to 
make three main contributions.  Firstly, this article has reviewed the context of consumer vulnerability 
in relation to third party complaint handling.  In both the UK and Australia complaints are rising in 
both the public and private sectors. Official statistics in both countries reveal a substantial number of 
people may be classified in a category where a high proportion are disadvantaged, resulting in higher 
susceptibility to vulnerability.  Risk factors for vulnerability and detriment include age, disability or 
other impairment, mental health issues, low income, sudden change is circumstances and complexity 
of the product or service. Secondly, the article has critiqued consumer vulnerability in the UK and 
Australia and has given a holistic definition to inform the development of processes of dispute system 
design. While acknowledging the consensus of several academics that there are situations where all 
consumers may be at risk of vulnerability, others view it as a multidimensional concept, as one 
focused on individual characteristics or where markets impact on consumers to make them vulnerable. 
Vulnerability may be viewed along a spectrum from persistent to transitory. The level of resources 
available to organisations is likely to influence the extent to which they can address the needs of 
vulnerable complainants.  
Thirdly, we have discussed the challenges of consumer vulnerability for third party complaint 
handling bodies and considered how they can be met. Drawing from good practice, the article has 
proposed solutions which will embed consumer vulnerability in the processes of dispute system 
design. Approaches include providing sensitive support for vulnerable complainants with tailored, 
individualised processes and developing processes for access to information, advice and support to 
help vulnerable consumers make complaints effectively.  A broad definition of consumer vulnerability 
reflects the complex reality of consumers’ experiences but also poses a key challenge for designers of 
complaint handling systems in terms of how can they identify and respond to an issue which can 
14 
 
potentially affect everyone?   We have sought to argue therefore that adopting an inclusive approach 
to dispute design is good for all consumers and not just those perceived as being vulnerable.   
 
Building on the findings of this article, further research is needed to better understand the needs of 
‘silent sufferers’, the training needs of staff (for example to avoid stereotyping complainants) and to 
assess organisation websites for accessibility. While the focus of this article has been on third party 
complaint handlers, there is also considerable scope for research at first tier to understand, engage and 
empower a greater range of consumers to complain and drive organisations to raise standards, learn 
from complaints and improve services.   
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